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ABSTRACT
Zero-knowledge proofs are an essential building block in many
privacy-preserving systems. However, implementing these proofs
is tedious and error-prone. In this paper, we present zksk, a well-
documented Python library for defining and computing sigma pro-
tocols: the most popular class of zero-knowledge proofs. In zksk,
proofs compose: programmers can convert smaller proofs into build-
ing blocks that then can be combined into bigger proofs. zksk fea-
tures a modern Python-based domain-specific language. This makes
possible to define proofs without learning a new custom language,
and to benefit from the rich Python syntax and ecosystem.
1 INTRODUCTION
Privacy-preserving systems use zero-knowledge proofs to prove
that outputs have been computed correctly, without revealing sen-
sitive information about inputs. In online voting systems, voters
prove that they correctly encrypted their vote, without revealing
any information about the selected candidate [1]. In anonymous
authentication systems, users prove that they have access to a re-
source, without revealing any information that could reveal their
identity or make accesses linkable [11, 18].
Implementing zero-knowledge proofs is tedious. Academic pa-
pers often use high-level Camenisch-Stadler notation [8] to suc-
cinctly specify the intent of the proofs. The concrete implementa-
tions of proofs, however, often require hundreds or thousands lines
of code. While not necessarily difficult, these implementations are
tedious and require implementing the same primitives repeatedly.
Implementations are also error-prone. To simplify deployment,
most systems use the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [14]. Incorrectly apply-
ing this heuristic, however, can lead to serious vulnerabilities. For
instance, in both the Helios and SwissPost/Scytl voting systems,
incorrect application of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic led to accepting
incorrect encrypted votes [7, 21, 22].
We propose zksk, the Zero-Knowledge Swiss Knife, a Python
library for defining and computing sigma protocols – the most
popular class of zero-knowledge proofs. The library provides a
simple API to define proofs inspired by the Camenisch-Stadler no-
tation [8]. Additionally, the zksk library protects the programmer
against mistakes. It applies the Fiat-Shamir construction correctly
automatically; and it refuses to compute or-proofs that would re-
veal secrets. Consider the zero-knowledge proof that an additive
ElGamal ciphertext [15] (c1, c2) = (дr ,дm · hr ) for a public key h
encrypts the valuem = 0 orm = 1. In Camenisch-Stadler notation,
we would write:
PK{(r ) : (c1 = дr ∧ c2 = hr ) ∨ (c1 = дr ∧ c2д−1 = hr )}
to denote the proof of knowledge of a secret r such that the expres-
sion after the colon holds. In our library we write (using additive
notation, and G and H for д and h):
r = Secret ()
enc0 = DLRep(c1, r * G) & DLRep(c2, r * H)
enc1 = DLRep(c1, r * G) & DLRep(c2 - G, r * H)
stmt = enc0 | enc1
to define the statement stmt of the same proof.
Systems often compose simpler zero-knowledge proofs to achieve
their purpose. In voting systems, the voter’s vote is usually repre-
sented by a vector of ciphertexts, each corresponding to a candidate.
To ensure correctness, voters prove that each ciphertext encrypts
a bit and that not too many bits are set. In anonymous authenti-
cation systems, users prove that they have a credential and that
this credential has not yet been revoked. Zero-knowledge proofs
defined in zksk support composition. For example, the statement
stmt in the example composes the two disjuncts enc0 and enc1.
The zksk library also makes it easy to define new building blocks
that can themselves be composed. For example, zksk already defines
a range-proof construction. Consider a voting scheme in which the
voter can select at most 5 candidates. Then the voter must show
that the sum of votes, another ElGamal ciphertext (c1, c2), encrypts
m such that 0 ≤ m < 5. We express this in zksk as:
r = Secret ()
m = Secret ()
enc_stmt = DLRep(c1, r * G) & DLRep(c2, m * G + r * H)
# Prove that c2 commits to m (bases G, H) and 0 <= m < 5
range_stmt = RangeStmt(c2, G, H, 0, 5, m, r)
stmt = enc_stmt & range_stmt
Existing libraries and compilers. In this work, we focus on
sigma protocols. The tools for defining and computing generic
zero-knowledge proofs, such as zk-SNARKs [6], are thus out of
scope. See Table 1 for a comparison of sigma-protocol libraries.
The Secure Computation API (SCAPI) [13, 17] is a C++ library
that provides a small set of sigma-protocol primitives. Program-
mers write C++ code to define and compute proofs. The high-level
interface is well-documented, but to use individual primitives pro-
grammers must read the source code. Primitives can be composed
using AND and OR constructions, but SCAPI’s composition is lim-
ited: the programmer cannot specify that the same variable oc-
curs in multiple conjuncts. Instead, the programmer must define
a new primitive from scratch. The emmy Go library also imple-
ments several sigma-protocol primitives. Programmers write Go
code to define and compute proofs, but the primitives cannot be
combined with conjunctions or disjunctions to form bigger proofs,
and documentation is minimal.
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Table 1: Comparison between different zero-knowledge
proof libraries. Columns: AND, OR – support for conjunct
and disjunct statements, Composing (Cmp) – defined state-
ments compose into bigger statements, Interactive (Int) –
interactive prove/verification mode, FS – non-interactive
proofs throughFiat-Shamir heuristic, Language (Lang) – lan-
guage in which the tool is implemented, DSL – language in
which proofs can be defined, Documentation (Docs) – avail-
able documentation.
AND OR Cmp Int FS Lang DSL Docs
SCAPI [13, 17] ✓ ✓ ~ ✓ ✓ C++ C++ ✓
Emmy [28] × × × ✓ × Go - min.
YAZKC [2] ✓ ✓ × ✓ ✓ C Custom ~
Cashlib [23] ✓ × × × ✓ C++ Custom ~
zkp [12] ✓ × × × ✓ Rust Rust min.
zksk ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Python Python ✓
YAZKC (Yet Another Zero-Knowledge Compiler) [2] and Cash-
lib [23] instead use a custom language for defining zero-knowledge
proofs, and provide a compiler that transforms the specification
into code to compute and verify proofs. The YAZKC and Cashlib
DSLs resembles the notation of Camenisch and Stadler. Cashlib
does not support OR constructions, YAZKC does. In both cases,
the DSL does not support defining new high-level building blocks,
requiring proofs instead to be (re)written in their entirety in terms
of the DSL’s building blocks. We could not fully evaluate YAZKC as
the source is no longer available online. Both YAZKC and Cashlib
support hidden order groups. Our zksk library does not, as these are
nowadays usually replaced by pairings, which we do support. The
zkp Rust library [12] provides a Rust DSL to define simple proofs.
These proofs cannot be combined in disjunctions or conjunctions.
Contributions. In this paper we make the following contributions.
✓Wepresent zksk, a well-documented Python library that provides
an API for defining and computing zero-knowledge proofs.
✓ zksk protects programmers against common errors and supports
full composition (conjunctions and disjunctions). It comes with
useful building blocks that can be used to instantiate many existing
zero-knowledge proofs: proofs of signatures, range proofs, and
inequality proofs. Users can also define their own building blocks.
2 BACKGROUND
Throughout this paper, let G be a cyclic group of prime order q
generated by д. Let Zq be the integers modulo q. We write a ∥ b
for the concatenation of two strings, and a ∈R A to denote that
a is drawn uniformly at random from the finite set A. We call an
expression C = дx11 · · ·дxnn a discrete logarithm representation of C
with respect to the bases д1, . . . ,дn .
In this paper, we focus on sigma protocols [10]: 3-move zero-
knowledge proofs [16], that provide honest-verifier zero-knowledge.
The most well-known example is Schnorr’s proof of identifica-
tion [25], see Figure 1. It proceeds in three phases: (1) the prover
sends a commitment, the value R ; (2) the verifier sends a challenge
c ; and (3) the prover sends a response sx . Finally, the verifier checks
the correctness of the response. Every sigma protocol follows this
structure. In Camenisch-Stadler notation [8], we express the proof
statement as PK{(x) : X = дx } to denote that the prover proves
knowledge of the (secret) value x such that X = дx .
Common input: group (G,д,q) and X = дx
Prover Verifier
Input: x ∈ Zq
rx ∈R Zq
R = дrx
R
c c ∈R Zq
sx = rx − c · x (mod q) sx Verify R = X cдsx
Figure 1: Schnorr’s proof of identity. A simple sigma proto-
col that proves knowledge of x such that X = дx .
The protocol is zero-knowledge because transcripts (R , c, sx ) that
are accepted by the verifier can be simulated without knowledge of
the secret [25]. Intuitively, the verifier can therefore not convince
anybody else of the veracity of the statement.
Sigma protocols can be combined using conjunctions, e.g., prove
knowledge of the discrete logarithms of X1 and X2 (with respect to
д1 and д2 ), and in fact that they are the same:
PK{(x) : X1 = дx1 ∧ X2 = дx2 }.
To do so, run two Schnorr identification protocols in parallel, using
the same randomizer for the secret x . This approach enables proving
arbitrary conjunctions. See Figure 2 in the appendix for the details.
Sigma protocols can also be combined using disjunctions, e.g.,
we can prove knowledge of the discrete logarithm of X1 or X2:
PK{(x) : X1 = дx1 ∨ X2 = дx2 }.
The OR construction [10], simulates the untrue disjunct, while
honestly proving the true disjunct. We provide the detailed protocol
in Figure 3 in appendix.
The Fiat-Shamir heuristic [14] turns interactive protocols into
non-interactive proofs. With this heuristic, the prover computes
the challenge c by hashing its commitments together with the proof
statement. For Schnorr’s protocol in Figure 1, she would compute
c = H (R ∥ X ). Including the proof statement (in this case including
X suffices) is essential, lest the prover can fake proofs [7].
3 ZKSK DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we overview the core functionalities of zksk from
a user’s perspective, and then outline how they are implemented.
Code examples are written in Python. The library is open source
and is extensively documented.1 The compiler relies on the petlib2
Python bindings to OpenSSL to support elliptic curves and pairings.
3.1 Components
Discrete logarithm representations. The zksk library makes it
easy to express equations about discrete logarithm representations,
the basic building block of sigma protocols. Listing 1 shows how to
express the statement PK{(x , r ) : C = дxhr }, and how to construct
and verify the corresponding proof. We assume the values C, G, and
1https://github.com/spring-epfl/zksk
2https://github.com/gdanezis/petlib
H are defined and in scope. First, the prover defines the values of
which it will prove knowledge (lines 2–3). Note that it passes in
the real values of the secrets. Then it expresses the proof statement
(line 4). The first argument of DLRep is the left-hand side of the
discrete logarithm representation, the right-hand side expresses the
left-hand side in terms of the bases and secrets. Finally, it constructs
the (non-interactive) proof (line 5). The verifier first defines the
proof statement (lines 8–9), and uses it to verify the proof (line 10).
1 # Prover
2 x = Secret (20)
3 r = Secret (1337)
4 stmt = DLRep(C, x * G + r * H)
5 proof = stmt.prove()
6
7 # Verifier
8 x_prime , r_prime = Secret (), Secret ()
9 stmt_prime = DLRep(C, x_prime * G + r_prime * H)
10 assert stmt_prime.verify(proof)
Listing 1: Using zksk to prove and verify the statement
PK{(x , r ) : C = дxhr }. In the code C is the commitment C.
Conjunctions and disjunctions.We can combine statements into
conjunctions or disjunctions. The & (and) operator combines state-
ments into a conjunction: the library will prove that secrets that
appear in multiple statements are the same. Similarly, the | (or)
operator combines statements into a disjunction. Checking which
disjunct is true is computationally expensive. Thus, zksk requires
the prover to indicate whether a disjunct is true or simulated:
x = Secret (12345)
stat = DLRep(X1, x * G1, simulated=True) |
DLRep(X1, x * G2, simulated=False)
Defining and using primitives. The zksk library includes several
useful primitives to define more complicated statements: proofs
of knowledge of a BBS+ signature [4], inequality of discrete loga-
rithms [18], and range proofs [5, 26]. The syntax is as follows:
# Possession of BBS+ signature over messages:
msgs = [Secret () for _ in range (4)]
stmt1 = BBSPlusSignatureProof(msgs , pk)
# Inequality of discrete logs (see below):
stmt2 = DLRepNotEqual ([Y1, G1], [Y2, G2])
# Let com = x * G + r * H be a commitment to x
# Proof that x lies in the range [a, b):
x, r = Secret (), Secret ()
stmt3 = RangeStmt(com , G, H, a, b, x, r)
Users can easily define new primitives. These primitives could
require extra computations and verifications. We take as an exam-
ple the proof of inequality of two discrete logarithms by Henry and
Goldberg [18], proving the statement PK{(x) : H0 = hx0 ∧H1 , hx1 }.
This statement cannot be directly translated into the primitives we
have defined before. Instead, we follow Henry and Goldberg’s ap-
proach. The prover first picks a randomizer r ∈R Zq and computes
the value C = (hx1 /H1)r , and then proves:
PK
{
(α , β) : 1 = hα0 H β0 ∧C = hα1 H
β
1
}
where α = xr mod q and β = −r mod q. When verifying the
proof, the verifier needs to additionally check that C , 1.
Primitives in zksk extend the ExtendedProofStmt class, provide
a constructor, and override the construct_stmt to return a proof
statement. Moreover, they can override precommit to compute a
precommitment, and validate to perform post-validation.
Listing 2 shows how to implement the DLNotEqual proof. First,
we define the constructor. It stores the arguments (lines 3–5), com-
putes some convenience values (lines 7–8), and defines the secrets
alpha and beta (line 11). Then, we override the precommit func-
tion to compute the value C that acts as a precommitment (lines
13–21). This function also sets the values of the secrets alpha and
beta. The function construct_proof returns the proof statement
defined above (lines 23–29). Finally, validate (lines 31–33) verifies
that C is not the unity element.
1 class DLNotEqual(ExtendedProofStmt):
2 def __init__(self , valid_pair , invalid_pair , x):
3 self.lhs = [valid_pair [0], invalid_pair [0]]
4 self.bases = [valid_pair [1], invalid_pair [1]]
5 self.x = x
6
7 self.infty = self.bases [0]. group.infinite ()
8 self.order = self.bases [0]. group.order()
9
10 # The internal proof uses two constructed secrets
11 self.alpha , self.beta = Secret (), Secret ()
12
13 def precommit(self):
14 blinder = self.order.random ()
15
16 # Set the value of the two internal secrets
17 self.alpha.value = self.x.value * blinder % order
18 self.beta.value = -blinder % order
19
20 precommitment = blinder * (self.x.value * self.
bases [1] - self.lhs [1])
21 return precommitment
22
23 def construct_stmt(self , precom):
24 p1 = DLRep(infty ,
25 self.alpha * self.bases [0] +
26 self.beta * self.lhs [0])
27 p2 = DLRep(precom , self.alpha * self.bases [1] +
28 self.beta * self.lhs [1])
29 return p1 & p2
30
31 def validate(self , precommitment):
32 if self.precommitment == self.infty:
33 raise ValidationError("Invalid precommitment")
Listing 2: Full implementation of the DLNotEqual primitive.
New primitives created by extending ExtendedProofStmt com-
pose as any other proof statement. However, they cannot be them-
selves used in the constructed proof of other new primitives using
ExtendedProofStmt. We aim to add this functionality soon.
3.2 Implementation
Robust statement identifiers. The correct application of the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic mandates including a representation of the state-
ment in the hash function. Computing such a representation, how-
ever, is difficult. Consider the two statements:
x, y = Secret (), Secret ()
p1 = DLRep(A, x * G) & DLRep(B, x * H) & DLRep(C, y * Z)
p2 = DLRep(A, x * G) & DLRep(B, y * H) & DLRep(C, y * Z)
Input: a (compositional) proof statement stmt
Output: a non-interactive π = (precommitment, chal, resp)
1 Recursively call precommit() on all parts of stmt
2 Let precommitment be the combined precommitments
3 Create constructed proofs for all parts of stmt
4 Verify that secrets inside OR clause do not appear elsewhere
5 Let sec1, . . . , secn be the unique secrets in all parts of stmt
6 Pick randomizers rand1, . . . , randn for the secrets
7 Compute commitment for stmt recursively using {randi }
8 Let chal = H (repr(stmt) ∥ precommitment ∥ commitment)
9 Compute {respi } for each secret using chal and {randi }.
10 Return π = (precommitment, chal, resp)
Listing 3: Computing a non-interactive proof
The zksk library must differentiate between the secret x appearing
twice, and the secret y appearing twice. Moreover, this methodmust
be robust even if the prover’s and verifier’s statement definition
execute on different machines. Hence, we cannot use Python’s
built-in object identifiers, as they can change across executions.
One way for differentiating the secrets would be to assign a
canonical unique name to each secret. Our initial experiments
showed, however, that manually assigning names to secrets re-
sults in cumbersome code. Therefore, zksk automatically assigns
identifiers to secrets in the order in which they first occur in the
statement. See Listing 4 in the appendix for the details.
Computing proofs. A call to stmt.prove(), see Listing 1, com-
putes a non-interactive proof as in Listing 3. First we compute
the precommitments and the concrete constructed proofs for the
custom primitives (lines 1–3). Lines 5–10 then execute the proof,
similarly to Figure 1.
The library tries to actively prevent programmer errors. Line 8
applies the strong Fiat-Shamir heuristic [7]: it adds the statement’s
representation as input to the hash function.
The library also detects dangerous OR proofs. Consider a simpli-
fication of the statement on page 1 that (c1, c2) encrypts a bit:
PK{(r ) : c1 = дr ∧ (c2 = hr ∨ c2д−1 = hr )}
A naïve application of steps 5–10, which picks one randomizer for
r and uses that randomizer in both conjuncts results in a proof that
reveals r itself. Let e be the challenge received from the verifier.
Suppose the first disjunct is true. To prove the full statement, the
naïve approach first simulates the second disjunct, obtaining a
transcript with a challenge e2. The challenge for the first disjunct is
then e1 = e − e2 (mod q). As a result, the naïve approach uses the
challenge e for the first conjunct (c1 = дr ) and the challenge e1 for
the first disjunct (c2 = hr ). However, given responses for secret r
for two different challenges with the same randomizer, an attacker
can trivially extract r , violating the zero-knowledge property.
The zksk library prevents this flaw by requiring that secrets
that appear in OR clauses cannot also appear elsewhere. It is up
to the programmer to resolve this problem when detected. On
page 1, we moved the first conjunct inside, creating a disjunctive
normal form. An alternative is to bind the offending secret to a
Pedersen commitment, and then repeat that commitment inside
the OR clause.
4 EVALUATION
To determine the overhead of using a Python library when comput-
ing proofs, we compare it to the time of computing the proofs with
the underlying cryptographic library. We first measure the running
time of proving knowledge of a BBS+ signature using zksk. We
then compute a lower bound on the cost without zksk by counting
the number of group operations the proof takes and multiplying
it by the cost of group operations in the underlying cryptographic
library. This lower bound does not include hash functions nor mod-
ular arithmetic. We find that 90% of the running time for zksk is due
to the group operations. We conclude that the overhead of using a
Python library is small. See Appendix A for more details.
We did a small literature study to determine the usefulness of
zksk. We explored papers in the last two editions of relevant aca-
demic conferences: PETS, ACM CCS, WPES, and NDSS, and found
7 papers that use sigma protocols. All of these protocols can be
implemented with zksk. See Table 2 in the appendix for more
details.
5 CONCLUSIONS
We presented zksk, a Python-based library for defining and com-
puting zero-knowledge proofs based on sigma protocols. Unlike
existing libraries, zksk does not rely on a custom language to define
proofs, but on an easy-to-use Python-based DSL. It provides several
high-level primitives, and makes it easy to define new high-level
primitives, all of which can be composed to construct bigger proofs.
A small literature study shows that zksk is indeed sufficient to
implement sigma protocols encountered in real research papers.
We hope that zksk will be a valuable tool to make defining and
evaluating such protocols easier.
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A DETAILS OF EVALUATION
Overhead in computing proof of knowledge of a BBS+ signa-
ture. We consider a BBS+ signature with 10messages, and construct
a proof of knowledge of that signature that hides all 10 messages us-
ing zksk. For a zksk-compatible implementation of cryptographic
pairings, we use the bplib3 library. Proving takes about 146ms,
whereas verification takes about 160ms.
BBS+ signatures require a pairing setting with groupsG1,G2 and
GT . Based on amanual implementation of the zero-knowledge proof
in C, we conclude that zkskmust compute 8 exponentiations inG1,
3https://github.com/gdanezis/bplib
Common input: group (G,д,q), group elements д1,д2,X1, X2
Prover Verifier
Input: x s.t. X1 = дx1
Let (R2, c2, s2) be a simu-
lation of PK{(x) : X2 = дx2 }
r1 ∈R Zq
R1 = д
r1
1
R1,R2
c1 = c − c2 (mod q) c c ∈R Zq
s1 = r1 − c1 · x (mod q) c1, c2, s1, s2 Verify R1 = X c11 дs11 ,
R2 = X
c2
2 д
s2
2 , and
c = c1 + c2 (mod q)
Figure 3: Proof of knowledge of discrete logairthm of X1 or
X2. (Assuming the prover knows x such that X1 = дx1 )
Inputs:
a compositional proof statement stmt
optional mapping of secrets to identifiers secret_id_map
Output: a robust proof-statement identifier
1 If secret_id_map is not given:
2 Recursively get secret variables from all parts of stmt
3 Let secrets be the combined secret variables
4 Assign identifiers to secrets in order of occurrence
5 let secret_id_map assign these identifiers to secrets.
6 Recursively call get_proof_id with secret_id_map
7 on all parts of stmt
8 Return the concatenation of obtained proof identifiers
9 Else:
10 Set secret_ids according to secret_id_map
11 for each own secret variable.
12 Return identifier (name, bases, secret_ids)
Figure 4: get_proof_id: Procedure that computes a robust
reprsentation of a proof statement, repr(stmt).
14 exponentiations in GT and 15 pairing computations to compute
a proof; and 6 exponentiations in G1, 15 in GT , and 13 pairings
to verify the proof. Based on measurements on the underlying
bplib library, we estimate the lower bound on the running time of
proving and verifying at 139ms and 146ms respectively. Therefore,
we conclude that the raw cryptographic operations account for
more than 90% of the running time in zksk.
Sigma protocols in recent papers. We explored published pa-
pers in the last two years of PETS, ACM CCS, WPES, and NDSS.
We found 7 papers that use sigma protocols. All of them can be
implemented using zksk. Privacy Pass [11], however, uses an op-
timized batch verification protocol that zksk currently does not
support. The zksk library does support the basic version of the
protocol, and can be used to define a new primitive that supports
batch verification.
Table 2: Overview of papers using sigma protocols in recent editions of PETS, ACM CCS, WPES and NDSS. The table lists for
each paper, the protocol in that paper, which zksk primitives it needs to implement it, and which composition operations
(AND/OR) are needed to define the full proof.
Title Year Conference Protocol Primitives Composition
Mesh: A Supply Chain Solution with Locally Private
Blockchain Transactions [3]
2019 PETS Membership Proof DLRep And, Or
Cryptography for #MeToo [20] 2019 PETS ElGamal.Prove DLRep And
SecShare.Exp DLRep And
Privacy-Preserving Similar Patient Queries for Com-
bined Biomedical Data [24]
2019 PETS Blinding Correctness DLRep And
Privacy Pass: Bypassing Internet Challenges Anony-
mously [11]
2018 PETS Token Signing DLRep And
Coconut: Threshold Issuance Selective Disclosure
Credentials [27]
2019 NDSS IssueCred DLRep And
ProveCred DLRep And
Solidus: Confidential Distributed Ledger Transactions
via PVORM [9]
2017 CCS Hidden-Public-Key Signature DLRep And
3-Move Range Proof [5, 26] RangeStmt
ClaimChain: Improving the Security and Privacy of
In-band Key Distribution for Messaging [19]
2018 WPES Claim Correctness DLRep And
Inter-Block Non-Equivocation DLRep And, Or
